This paper presents a reference price model for competition in a duopoly market for a single product. We derive Markov-Perfect equilibrium pricing policies. We provide a closed-form heuristic and demonstrate that it is very close to the equilibrium. We also derive closed-form solutions for pricing policies of a retailer who is an optimizer when its competitor follows one of three different suboptimal policies, and prove monotone convergence of these solutions. Finally, we use our results to analyze the impact of competition by comparing the revenue from the equilibrium policy with the one from a non-competition policy.
Introduction
Traditional literature in pricing assumes that there is no interaction between the firms and their customers. While this assumption is often crucial to the analysis of the models, it can be very unrealistic. As a result, more sophisticated pricing models that incorporate customer behavior have emerged in recent years. A branch of the dynamic pricing literature has taken a particular interest in the concept of a reference price. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) noted that this is an important element that, in the past, was largely missing from the academic literature and price optimization softwares. For businesses that have repeated interaction with customers, price expectation is formed through past experiences. Subsequently, the utility of consumption is affected when there is a mismatch between the current and the expected price, and when the reference price is below the observed price, customers perceive gains and purchasing becomes more attractive (Hardie et al. (1993) ). The most common framework for the formation of the reference price is an exponentially weighted average of the past observed prices, where consumers are given memory parameters associated with past prices (see Winer (1985 Winer ( , 1986 , Kalwani et al. (1990) , Briesch et al. (1997) , Putler (1992) and Greenleaf (1995) for more details). For a review of the theoretical foundations and modeling of the reference price concept we refer the reader to Winer (1988) . Recent papers focus on developing dynamic pricing models with reference price effect to find optimal pricing strategies that would maximize retailers' profit. This paper presents a dynamic pricing model in the presence of competition incorporating the concept of customer's reference price. The concept of reference price provides a good framework for modeling competition. The economics literature models competition in the market by directly assuming that the demand of a product is a function of it's competitor's price, in addition to its own price. We propose an alternative model where the retailers compete through their influences on the reference price.
Dynamic Pricing Model
We consider the case of two retailers each selling a single product (For a MultiProduct case, refer to (Kachani et al. (2014a) ). The demand for the product from the store i is a function of the price p and the reference price r and is denoted by D i (p, r). It is given by
where a i , b i , and c i are positive.
Competition is modeled through the dynamics of the reference price. the reference price has a memory coefficient α as in the monopoly case (Kachani et al. (2014b) ). We let µ i be the influence factor of store i on the reference price. We can view µ i as a measure of the store i's presence in the market.
The dynamics of the reference price in this case are:
where 0 ≤ α < 1.
The retailer chooses a pricing policy that maximizes its total revenue. Hence, the Bellman equation we need to solve for the optimal pricing policy is given by:
3 Optimal pricing policy with a suboptimal competitor
In this section, we derive the optimal pricing policy for a retailer when:
• its competitor's price is constant
• its competitor's price is a linear function of the retailer's own price
• its competitor follows a myopic pricing policy
We also prove the monotone convergence in the three cases.
Competitor's price is constant
Theorem 3.1 The optimal pricing policy for a retailer whose competitor's price is constant at p 2 is given by
(2) where
To prove this result, we postulate that the value function of retailer 1 is given by
The Bellman equation (1) becomes
Since the competitor's price p 2 is constant, the optimal price can be obtained by simply optimizing the Bellman equation (3) over p 1 . Solving
= 0 yields the optimal pricing policy (2). Then, by substituting (2) into (3), and collecting the coefficients of the polynomial, we can solve for γ 1 , δ 1 and 1 and get the desired results. Next, we need to establish that the postulate is valid by showing that the coefficients of the value function are nonnegative real numbers. The expression for γ 1 is the smaller root of the quadratic equation
Suppose that (4) has real roots, then it is easy to see that γ 1 is positive because the coefficients of the quadratic and the constant term are positive, whereas the coefficient of the linear term is negative. To show that the roots are real, we rewrite the term inside the square root as
which is nonnegative. To show that δ 1 is well defined and positive, we need to show that
This is true if and only if
Which holds because the left hand side is negative. Finally, 1 is well defined and positive if and only if
Which is again true because b 1 and c 1 are positive and
In addition, we can also derive the expression for the transition of the reference price under the optimal pricing policy. It is given by
Finally, the steady state reference price is given by:
The last equality is from substituting the expressions for δ 1 , and using (4) to complete the square in the denominator.
Competitor's Price is a Linear Function of the Retailer's Price
Proposition 3.2 The optimal pricing policy for a retailer whose competitor's price is a linear function of its own price, namely, p 2 = θp 1 + ρ, with θ > 0 and ρ > 0, is given by
where
The proof to this proposition is similar to that of theorem 3.1. Using the same postulate for the optimal value function, and substituting p 2 = θp 1 + ρ into (1), we get
Similarly, solving
= 0 yields the optimal pricing policy (8) . Then, by substituting (8) into (9), and collecting the coefficients of the polynomial, we solve for γ 1 , δ 1 , and 1 and get the desired result. Following the same approach in the proof of theorem 3.1, we can easily verify that γ 1 , δ 1 , and 1 are well defined, positive and real. The transition of the reference price under the optimal pricing policy is given by
And the steady state reference price is given by:
Competitor is a Myopic Optimizer
A retailer who is a myopic optimizer prices the product to maximize the current-period revenue, i.e.,
Proposition 3.3 The optimal pricing policy for a retailer whose competitor is a myopic optimizer is given by
, and
. Then, the myopic pricing policy of the competitor can be written as p 2 (r) = ψr + φ. Since p 2 (r) is not a function of p 1 , we get the optimal pricing policy (13) by substituting (12) into (2), which is the optimal pricing policy of theorem 3.1, when the competitor's price is constant. Similarly, by substituting (13) into the value function (3) in the proof of theorem 3.1, and collecting the coefficients of the polynomial, we solve for γ 1 , δ 1 , and 1 and get the desired results. Following the same approach in the proof of theorem 3.1, we can easily verify that γ 1 , δ 1 , and 1 are well defined, positive and real.
The transition of the reference price under the optimal pricing policy is given by
Monotonocity and Convergence
Condition (5) implies that p * 1 (r) in (2) and g * (r) in (6) are positive and strictly increasing for all r ≥ 0. Since g * (r) is linear in r, it suffices to show that r * * is positive and finite. It is easy to see from the expression of r * * in (7) that this is true.
Competitor's price is a linear function of the retailer's price:
Similarly, we need to show that p * 1 (r) in (8) and g * (r) in (10) are positive and strictly increasing for all r ≥ 0, and the steady state price r * * in (11) is positive and finite. All of these are true if γ 1 in proposition 3.2 satisfies the following inequality: 
Competitor is a myopic optimizer:
First, we need to show that p * 1 (r) in (13) and g * (r) in (14) are positive and strictly increasing for all r ≥ 0. Since ψ ≥ 0 and φ ≥ 0, this is true if γ 1 in proposition 3.3 satisfies the following inequality: 
Finally, the steady state price r * * in (15) is well defined and positive because
Markov Perfect Equilibrium when both retailers are optimizers
In this section, we consider the case where both retailers are optimizers. In this setting, the retailers are playing an infinitely-repeated game. Since they are both maximizing their total discounted revenue, The Markov Perfect (MP) equilibrium prices can be determined by solving the following Bellman equations simultaneously:
To solve this system of equations, we postulate that the value function for each retailer is given by
and the optimal pricing policy is given by
First, let us look at the Bellman equation for retailer 1
The optimal price can be determined by taking the partial derivative of (19) with respect to p 1 , and setting it equal to zero. Solving
By collecting the coefficients of r, and equating them to the postulate in (18), we get:
Substituting (18) into (19), and collecting the coefficients of the polynomial, we can solve for γ 1 , δ 1 and 1 and obtain the following solutions:
Solving (20) for γ 1 , we get:
Finally, we equate (22) to (25) to get
In addition, we have the following expression for retailer 2:
By following a similar procedure, we can solve (21) for δ 1 , and equate it to (23) to get
Similarly, for retailer 2 we have
Now, we can solve for the equilibrium pricing policies p * 1 (r) and p * 2 (r) by simultaneously solving (26) and (27) for ζ 1 and ζ 2 , and (28) and (29) for ν 1 and ν 2 . Even though closed-form expressions for ζ 1 and ζ 2 do not exist, we can determine their values by easily solving equations (26) and (27) numerically. Once ζ 1 and ζ 2 are determined, γ 1 and γ 2 are given by (22). Equations (28) and (29) can be solved analytically for the closed form solutions of ζ 1 and ζ 2 . However, their expressions are cumbersome and are omitted here. Finally, δ 1 and δ 2 are given by (23), and 1 and 2 are given by (24).
We propose here a heuristic that approximates the MP equilibrium prices for which we provide a closed form expression. We will illustrate numerically that the solutions of this heuristic are very close to the equilibrium prices obtained by numerically solving the implicit equations given above. The heuristic assumes that each retailer maximizes its revenue assuming that its competitor's pricing policy is a function of its price and the reference price will remain constant. Under this assumption, each retailer solves for the best response pricing function p 1 (p 2 , r) and p 2 (p 1 , r). This best response function is the same as the optimal pricing policy given by (2) . Since δ 1 is linear and 1 is quadratic in p 2 , we rewrite them as
Then, the best response pricing function in (2) can be rewritten as
The equilibrium pricing policy for this heuristic is the solution of
The transition of the reference price in this case is given by
And the steady-state reference price is given by:
To determine the accuracy of the heuristic, we randomly select 10,000 sets of demand parameters and compare the equilibrium prices p * (r) and the total discounted revenue V * (r). For each set of parameters, we compute:
• i) The percentage difference in revenue:
• ii) The average percentage difference in price during the path from r 0 to r * * :
Where T is the first time the reference price reaches the steady state r * * within a certain tolerance error ε (for table 1, we use ε = 10 −6 ). Table 1 summarizes the data and results of this analysis. We find that the median error of the total revenues and the prices are 0.003% and 1.4% respectively. The heuristic gives a very accurate estimate of the total discounted revenue, with a mean error of 1%, and 95 th percentile of only 4.31%. The error on the average difference in price is higher, with a mean of 4% and a 95 th percentile of 22%.
Comparison between Equilibrium Policy and Policy that Ignores Competition
In this section, we study the effects of competition in our model. We compare the prices and the revenues under the equilibrium policy to the policy where both retailers maximize their revenue without considering the existence of the other. In other words, they follow the optimal pricing policy of the monopoly case (Kachani et al. (2014)). Figure 1 shows the transition of the equilibrium prices and the reference price, when the demand for the two products are identical, but their prices have different weights µ i on the reference price.
As expected, we find that prices are significantly lower when retailers are considering competition. Next, we study the effects of different demand parameters. We compute the loss of revenue when both retailers ignore the competition. The loss of revenue may be negative, meaning that the retailers may receive higher revenue when they both ignore competition. Figure 2 shows the effect of the magnitude of demand a on the revenue loss. When the retailers have equal influence on the reference price, both their revenues increase when competition is ignored, and the gain is increasing in a. When µ = (0.75, 0.25), both retailers still gain from ignoring competition, and the more influential retailer achieves more gain. However, when all of the influence lies with one retailer, ignoring the competition has no impact on that retailer's revenue, but significantly reduces the revenue of the other. The loss of revenue of the retailer with no influence is increasing in a. Figure 4 shows the impact of the magnitude of the reference price effect factor c on the loss of revenue when both retailers ignore competition. We observe that the loss/gain of the revenue is a non-monotonic function of the magnitude of the reference price effect factor c. For instance, when the two retailers have equal influence on the reference price, their revenue gains are initially increasing with c, but become decreaseng once c exceeds a certain threshold. The loss of revenue of the retailer that has no influence on the reference price is increasing in c.
Figure 4: Effects of Magnitude of Reference Price Effects on revenue Loss
Overall, we find the retailers are better off when they both ignore competition. However, this is only when both retailers have some influence on the reference price. the right panels of figures 1, 2, and 3 show that the loss revenue of retailer 1 is never positive when µ 1 ≥ 0.5. In fact, it is only positive when µ 1 is close to zero (in these examples, when µ 1 ≤ 0.18).
Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a new competitive model where retailers interact through their influences on the customers' reference price. In the case of two retailers selling a single product, we derived closed-form solutions for pricing policies for a retailer who is an optimizer when its competitor is following three different suboptimal policies and proved monotone convergence of these policies. When both retailers are optimizers, we provided a system of cubic equations, which can be solved numerically for the MP equilibrium prices. We provided a closed-form heuristic solution that is very close to the MP equilibrium prices. We found that competition reduces revenue in that revenue from equilibrium prices is lower that revenue from the case where both retailers ignore competition and optimize their prices. We intend to extend our model to consider pricing of multiple products in a duopoly market.
